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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016.
II. Legislative And Regulatory Developments
On October 23, 2015, Kansas Administrative Regulation § 82-3-304,
Tests of Gas Wells, was amended to no longer require an annual shut-in
pressure test for gas wells, in addition to other changes detailed below. 1
The amendment made three main changes to the statute. First, it
lengthened the amount of time operators have to submit initial 24-hour
shut-in pressure tests on new gas wells from 30 days to 120 days. Second, it
increased the amount of gas a well must be capable of producing before
requiring certain annual testing requirements to 500 mcf per day. Finally, it
eliminated the need for operators to file annual exemptions for gas wells
incapable of producing enough gas to trigger the annual testing
requirements, which eliminated the need for an annual shut-in pressure
test. 2
These amendments were made for several reasons. Production at most
gas wells is low enough that the tests typically had no effect on the
minimum production allowable provided for by regulation at each well.
Also, shut-in pressures are low enough that the data gathered no longer had
much value. Another reason for the amendments was because low field
pressures coupled with the nature of the tests can cause negative effects on
production. The principal economic impact of these amendments will be the
savings to operators from no longer needing to file annual exemption forms
with the State Corporation Commission and no longer needing to conduct
annual shut-in pressure tests to obtain the exemptions. 3
Although outside of the applicable time frame of this article, it is worth
noting that effective July 1, 2015, SB 124 was enacted to regulate landspreading of solid waste generated by drilling oil and gas wells. The bill
requires the sellers of any property where land spreading has occurred
within the previous three years to disclose the land-spreading to any
potential purchaser of the property prior to closing. 4
1. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-304 (2015).
2. KANSAS CITIZENS UTILITY RATEPAYER BOARD, Kansas Corporation Commission––
K.A.R. § 82-3-304 (2015), http://www.crrb.ks.gov/regulation-detail/2015/06/02/kansascorporation-commission---k.a.r.-82-3-304.
3. Id.
4. S.B. 124, 2015 Leg., 1st Sess. (KS. 2015).
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III. Judicial Developments
A. Supreme Court Cases
Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas
In Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, the Supreme Court of
Kansas (“the Court”) addressed (1) whether an operator’s duty to bear the
expense of making gas marketable is satisfied when the operator delivers
raw natural gas to purchasers at the well in good faith transactions; and (2)
whether the operator may take into account the deductions and adjustments
identified in third-party purchase agreements when calculating royalties
owed to the lessors. 5
This was a class action for underpayment of royalties claimed under
twenty-five oil and gas leases entered into between 1944 and 1991, of
which Oil Producers, Inc. (“the Operator”) is the lessee-operator. 6 The
royalty provisions in the leases called for the royalty calculations to be
made based on a sale of gas at the well, or on the market value at the well. 7
Natural gas coming from the ground in its raw condition must be processed
before it is suitable for interstate pipelines. 8 The Operator lacked the means
to independently process the raw natural gas and make it suitable for
transport, so it entered into third-party purchase agreements where the
purchaser did the processing of the raw natural gas. 9 The expense of
processing the raw natural gas was deducted from the purchase price the
third-party purchaser paid to the Operator, and the Operator had been
deducting a proportionate share of that expense from the royalties paid to
the class of lessors (“the Class”). 10
At the lower court, the Class argued (1) the royalty payments should be
free of such deductions because the “marketable condition rule” places the
burden of making gas marketable solely on the operator; 11 (2) raw natural
gas is not marketable at the well since it was unsuitable for delivery into
interstate pipelines; 12 and (3) the deductions in the purchase contracts
simply represented expenses to make the gas marketable, which was the

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

352 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Kan. 2015).
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1036-37.
Id.
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Operator’s obligation alone. 13 The Operator argued its royalty payments
were proper because they were calculated on 100% of its actual proceeds
from its sale of the gas at the wellhead. 14
The lower court concluded the Operator’s obligation prohibits
deductions from royalties except as might be expressly authorized in the
lease, noting no such language appears. The Operator petitioned the
Supreme Court of Kansas for review, which was granted. 15
As the Court framed it, the primary issue in this case was whether an
operator is “solely responsible under the common-law marketable condition
rule for the costs and adjustments taken by third-party purchasers.” 16
Under Kansas law, a lease imposes on an operator an implied duty to
market the minerals produced. To satisfy this duty, an operator has to
market its production at reasonable terms within a reasonable time
following production. 17
In this case, the Operator claimed its duty was fulfilled when it entered
into the purchase agreements for sale of the gas at the wellhead and that the
pricing formulas in the purchase agreements gave both itself and the royalty
owners the opportunity to share in higher prices received for the gas as it
got closer to the consumer. 18
The Class argued “the ‘marketable condition rule,’ which is an offshoot
of the implied duty to market, imposes on the operators the obligation to
make gas marketable at the operators’ own expense.” 19 The Class further
claimed that “raw natural gas sold at the well is not marketable as a matter
of law or fact until it is processed and enters an interstate pipeline, so its
royalties cannot be reduced by the processing costs that are set out as
deductions in the purchase agreements.” 20
The Court turned to prior Kansas cases for guidance on this issue. In
Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., the lease required the operator to pay for gas
sold, “as royalty 1/8 of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the mouth of the
well.” 21 The operator had built a compressor station on the leased premises
to collect and compress the gas, which allowed the operator to sell the gas
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id. at 1039-40 (citing Smith v. Amoco Production Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001)).
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id.
388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964).
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and sought contribution from the royalty owners for the compression
costs. 22 In holding that the deductions of the expense of the compressor
station from the royalty payments were improper, the court in Gilmore
reasoned that the compression simply “made the gas marketable and was in
satisfaction of the duties of the lease [operator] to do so.” 23
In Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., the facts were nearly identical to
those in Gilmore, and the Court similarly held that the operator could not
deduct the compression cost from the gross proceeds in calculating the
royalties. 24
In Sternbe*rger v. Marathon Oil Co., 25 the lease language also required
the operator to pay royalties based on “the market price at the well for gas
sold or used.” 26 As in the prior cases, the operator built a compressor and
deducted a proportionate share of that expense from the royalties paid to the
lessors. However, in this case the third-party purchasers were unwilling to
build a gathering pipeline system to access the well, so the operator built
one at his own expense. The operator then deducted a proportionate share
of said expense from the royalties paid to the lessors. 27 The court in
Sternberger held that the operator could not deduct the compression cost
from its gross proceeds in computing royalties, but could deduct a
proportionate share of the expense of building the gathering pipeline system
from the royalty payments because the royalties were based on the market
value of the gas at the well, and the operators had done nothing to prepare
the wellhead gas for sale other than move it from the place where its value
was to be determined (the well) to the purchaser. 28
Taking these three cases into consideration, the Court in Fawcett
reasoned that (1) when gas is sold at the well it has been marketed; and (2)
when the operator is required to pay royalty on its proceeds from such sales,
the operator may not deduct any pre-sale expenses required to make the gas
acceptable to the third-party purchaser. 29
The Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the
case to the district court, holding that “when a lease provides for royalties
22. Id. at 604.
23. Id. at 606.
24. Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1 (1964).
25. Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (1995).
26. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 352 P.3d 1032, 1040-41 (Kan. 2015)
(quoting Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 793).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1041.
29. Id.
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based on a share of proceeds from the sale of gas at the well, and the gas is
sold at the well, the operator’s duty to bear the expense of making the gas
marketable does not, as a matter of law, extend beyond that geographical
point to post-sale expenses.” 30
B. Appellate Activity
Oxy USA, Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC
In Oxy USA, Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC, the Court of Appeals of Kansas
addressed, inter alia: (1) whether production within a unit, but outside of
the subject property, constitutes “production” as the term is used in a deed
reservation that fails to define “production”; and (2) whether failing to take
legal action to have the holder of an expired term ousted from the property
constitutes acquiescence and estops the reversionary interest holder from
claiming their reversionary interest. 31
In April 1945, Frank Luther conveyed a tract of land containing 160
acres, subject to an existing oil and gas lease (“the Luther lease”), unto
E.W. Rahenkamp, reserving a one-half interest in the mineral rights for a
period of twenty years “or as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals is
produced therefrom.” 32
The Luther lease was unitized and consolidated with neighboring
leaseholds and oil and gas was thereafter continuously produced on those
neighboring leaseholds. 33 However, no oil and gas was produced directly
on the Luther lease lands from March 27, 1945 until 2009, when Oxy USA,
Inc. began producing oil and/or gas from the Tice Cattle #3 well. 34
Through a series of conveyances: (i) Alice LaVelle King (“King”) is the
current owner of the interest conveyed unto E.W. Rahenkap in April 1945;
(ii) the one-half mineral interest reserved unto Frank Luther became vested
in multiple parties, inter alia, those parties identified herein as “the Luther
mineral interest holders”; and (iii) Oxy USA, Inc. became the successor
lessee under the Luther lease. 35
Oxy USA, Inc. was unable to determine who it should be making royalty
payments to under the Luther lease so it filed an interpleader and quiet title
action to determine who currently holds the mineral rights to the property. 36
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
360 P.3d 457 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Luther mineral
interest holders, holding that King’s reversionary interest was triggered in
1972, but that her claim was untimely and, as a result, she acquiesced in the
continuation of the Luther mineral interest. 37 King appealed, and the Luther
mineral interest holders cross-appealed the decision of the district court. 38
The first issue the Kansas Court of Appeals (“the Court”) examined was
whether production within a unit, but outside of the subject property,
qualifies as “production” in the context of a term reservation for a stated
term of years “or as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals is produced
therefrom.” 39
The Court first addressed this issue in Smith v. Home Royalty
Association, Inc., 40 reasoning that the terms of a lease could not control the
interpretation given to the terms of a deed, and therefore, if a deed does not
define production to include a unitized or consolidated lease agreement,
then the term “production” in the deed must only refer to production
occurring on the subject property. 41
The Court revisited the issue eight years later in Classen v. Federal Land
Bank of Wichita 42, overturning Smith and holding that “production within
the meaning of a defeasible term mineral interest included production
occurring on unitized or consolidated lease property.” 43
Ten years after Classen, the Court once more revisited the issue in
Kneller v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita. 44 This time the question before
the Court was whether the rule stated in Classen should be applied
retroactively to situations where the term of a defeasible mineral interest
had expired prior to the Classen decision. 45 The Court held that Classen
should not be applied retroactively, thus leaving Smith to control in
situations where the term of the reservation had expired prior to the Classen
decision. 46
Because the term reservation in Oxy USA, Inc. expired prior to Classen,
and there was no production on the subject property during the twenty-year
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 457, 461.
498 P.2d 98, 101-02 (Kan. 1972).
Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461.
617 P.2d 1255, 1257-59 (Kan. 1980).
Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461-62 (citing Classen, 617 P.2d at 1252-64).
799 P.2d 485, 489-90 (Kan. 1990).
Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461-62 (citing Kneller, 799 P.2d 485, 489-90).
Id.
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term, the Court held that Smith should control. Therefore, the Court held
that the reversionary interest was triggered and reverted to King. 47
The Court also examined whether failing to take legal action to have the
holder of an expired term ousted from the property constitutes acquiescence
and estops the reversionary interest holder from claiming their reversionary
interest. 48
Acquiescence is defined as “an assertion of rights inconsistent with past
conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or situations wherein it
would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which [the person] has acquiesced.” 49
The Luther mineral interest holders argue that King’s failure to take legal
action since 1972 to claim her reversionary interest constitutes
acquiescence and precludes her from now claiming ownership of the
reversionary interest. 50
The Court focused on the facts in the present case to determine this issue.
Because there was no production on the subject property until 2009, King
lacked any specific incentive to quiet title against the Luther mineral
interest holders unless she planned to sell the property. 51 The Court found
King’s lack of action to not be inconsistent with her present claim of
ownership. 52 Therefore, the Court held that a claim of acquiescence does
not apply to the reversionary interest of King. 53
The Court of Appeals of Kansas reversed and remanded the decision of
the district court with instructions to enter judgment for King.
C. Trial Activity
None reported.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 464 (quoting Harrin v. Brown Realty Co., 602 P.2d 79, 84 (Kan. 1979)).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
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